After selling out of my largest position recently, I had fresh capital to put to work. One company immediately caught my eye: Clearwater Paper Corp (CLW). The stock had just suffered a brutal selloff, as shares collapsed almost 30% after the latest earnings, and Mr. Market is now pricing Clearwater at a fraction of its tangible equity and sales, and at barely 3× the free cash flow management expects to generate in a normal year. This disconnect is exactly the kind of deep-value mispricing I look for. While the market seems convinced this company is in permanent decline, I see a classic case of confusing a cyclical downturn for a structural impairment.

I’ve invested 20% of my portfolio in CLW, a size reflecting my high conviction and my deep-value process. Some might be alarmed at my easiness in allocating one-fifth of my portfolio to a single stock. But that’s how I operate: when I see a margin of safety, I go in big. I allocate based on downside risk, not upside hope; the greater the downside protection, the larger the position. In Clearwater’s case, the downside is guarded by solid assets and a strong balance sheet, while the upside if the cycle turns is extremely compelling. In short, the price is so abysmally cheap that even accounting for the industry’s headwinds and a potentially long wait for recovery, it’s an investment that’s hard to pass up.

What does the company do?

Clearwater Paper Corp (CLW) is now one of the top five producers of solid bleached sulfate (SBS) paperboard in North America, with roughly 14% of total domestic capacity. In plainer terms, it’s a major player in the paperboard used for packaging; the sturdy white cardboard that becomes folding cartons, food boxes, and disposable food service containers we all use. Clearwater doesn’t typically make the finished boxes you see on shelves; instead, they sell large rolls of high-quality SBS paperboard to independent converters, who then print, cut, and fold it into packaging for consumer goods. This end market (packaging for food, consumer staples, etc.) is relatively resilient in demand, as people keep buying these products in any economy, but the pricing Clearwater can charge still swings with industry supply and demand cycles.

In 2024, Clearwater dramatically transformed its business. It made two major moves:

• It acquired the Augusta, Georgia paperboard mill for $700 million (a deal that added significant SBS capacity with minimal goodwill of about $50M, meaning most of that $700M went into tangible assets).

• It sold its entire consumer tissue division for $1.06 billion in cash, and used the proceeds to pay down roughly $850 million of debt. This deleveraging left the company with just $275 million of notes outstanding (due 2028 at a low 4.75% rate).

At the same time, Clearwater initiated a $100 million share repurchase program, representing a sizeable authorization equal to nearly one-third of the current market cap. They’ve already started buying back stock under this program (about $18 million repurchased so far through mid-2025). The end result of these moves is that Clearwater is now a pure-play paperboard company with a much stronger balance sheet and a focused business model. It also has the flexibility to reinvest in its highest-return projects and to repurchase shares when the stock is undervalued.

In short, the company today looks very different from a year or two ago. It shed a low-margin tissue business, doubled down on paperboard, cut its debt load by over 75%, and streamlined operations. This sets the stage for the core thesis: Clearwater is a solid cyclical business that’s been derisked and positioned for the eventual upcycle, yet the stock price doesn’t at all reflect that potential.

Why the Market Sold Off

On the surface, Clearwater’s recent quarterly results (Q2 2025) were decent. Net sales grew 14% year-over-year to $392 million and adjusted EBITDA came in at $40 million, right in the middle of management’s guidance. The company also continued to trim costs and even bought back a bit more stock. However, Wall Street had expected even stronger numbers, as analysts were apparently modeling a bigger post-acquisition boost, and when those outsized expectations weren’t met, sentiment turned sour quickly. Essentially, hitting guidance wasn’t enough because the Street’s bar was higher.

But the real blow came from management’s guidance for the upcoming quarter (Q3 2025), which spooked investors badly. Management said to expect Q3 adjusted EBITDA of just $10–20 million, a steep drop from Q2’s $40 million. Several factors were mentioned for this short-term downturn:

• A major planned maintenance outage at the Lewiston mill that quarter, which would directly cost about $23–25 million and also reduce production volumes by ~5% during the downtime.

• Potential headwinds from tariffs and imports.

• Lower cost absorption due to running mills at less-than-full capacity (when you produce fewer tons, your fixed costs per ton rise, squeezing margins).

That weak Q3 outlook implied a dramatic sequential step-down, and analysts quickly extrapolated that maybe things would stay bad well into 2026. On the earnings call, management commentary added fuel to the fire:

• Utilization rates: They noted industry operating rates for SBS fell to around 83% in Q2, well below the healthy 90–95% range, mainly because new competitor capacity came online into an already soft market. An 83% utilization is downcycle territory and means lots of fixed costs aren’t being covered.

• Mixed demand signals: Industry SBS shipments were down ~4–5% year-over-year in Q2 (reflecting some economic softness), but backlogs were actually up double-digits from Q1. In other words, the data sent a conflicted message: is demand slackening or about to rebound? This uncertainty made it hard to predict the near-term outlook.

• Timing of recovery: Perhaps most importantly, management was candid that a rebound in the market might depend on factors outside their control. They emphasized that a normalization in operating rates (back towards 90%+) would likely require some capacity to exit the industry, or tariffs to curb the flood of imports (700–800k tons of SBS imports annually), or some competitors’ mills switching to other grades. In short, the supply glut needs to ease, but that would happen through industry consolidation or trade actions, not something Clearwater alone can shape.

• Q4 pressures: They reminded investors that Q4 2025 would have another large maintenance outage at a different mill. Plus, given all the headwinds, management was essentially framing full-year 2025 as a “transition year” rather than a recovery year. In other words, significant earnings improvement might not show up until 2026.

All of this landed with a thud. Investors heard “utilization in the low 80s%, new capacity flooding the market, uncertain demand, no quick fix in sight, more downtime ahead”, and many concluded that Clearwater’s problems must be structural and lasting. In their view, SBS paperboard might be in permanent oversupply, a business destined to earn subpar returns indefinitely. The market proceeded to price CLW as if it were a melting ice cube, marking the stock down to levels that imply an existential crisis.

Here’s where I think the market is plain wrong. The evidence strongly suggests that what we’re seeing is the down-cycle leg of a normal industry cycle, not the death of the business. Yes, 2025 is going to be a weak year for earnings, and management has been upfront about that. But nothing I’ve seen indicates that SBS packaging demand has fallen off a cliff or that Clearwater’s assets are obsolete. Rather, we’re in a period of temporary oversupply and maintenance-related drag. Clearwater’s own through-the-cycle targets of 13–14% EBITDA margins and $100M+ in annual free cash flow are still absolutely achievable once the cycle turns back in favor. And I believe those targets, because they align with historical industry profitability when capacity and demand balance out.

In short, this looks like a classic cyclical trough, the kind that savvy investors often try to buy into. The market, however, appears to be treating it as a secular decline. That misperception is our opportunity.

Balance Sheet = Downside Protection

When you invest in a cyclical company during a downturn, one thing matters above all: do they have the time and financial strength to weather the storm? In Clearwater’s case, the answer is a resounding yes. The company’s balance sheet provides a huge margin of safety, effectively cushioning the downside while we wait for the cycle to improve.

Start with the debt profile. After the big paydown from the tissue sale, Clearwater has no significant debt maturities until 2028. The only debt left is that $275 million of notes due August 2028, carrying a fixed 4.75% interest rate. That’s a very manageable amount, and the interest expense is quite low. There’s no looming refinancing risk, no short-term creditor pressure. This is critical. It means the company won’t be forced into any dilutive equity raise or fire-sale of assets just because of a temporary earnings slump. They have breathing room for years.

Next, liquidity. Clearwater has over $500 million of available liquidity between cash on hand and undrawn credit lines. This is a major buffer to fund operations and required maintenance capex through the downturn. Major maintenance outages cost money (tens of millions), and cyclical dips can eat up working capital, but Clearwater has planned for this. That liquidity means they can handle 2025’s heavy outage schedule and any short-term cash burn without problem.

Now, the quality of the assets. The company’s book value is real, as it’s not puffed up by goodwill or accounting intangibles. In fact, after the Augusta acquisition, goodwill on the balance sheet is only about $50M (roughly 7% of the deal cost). The vast majority of Clearwater’s equity is in tangible assets: paper mills, equipment, land, inventory. These are productive assets with replacement costs far above their book value. To build an integrated SBS mill from scratch today would cost well over a billion. Yet Clearwater’s entire enterprise value right now (market cap plus net debt) is only around $650M. The stock, around the low $20s per share, trades at roughly 0.44× tangible book value, essentially valuing the assets at less than half of their accounting value, which is itself likely a fraction of replacement cost. For context, the last time CLW traded at anything near this discount to tangible book was during the depths of the 2008–09 Great Recession. Today, by contrast, credit markets are calm and Clearwater’s bonds trade at or near par, signaling no distress. Historically, through cycles, CLW has usually traded much higher than tangible book, and most recently around 1.0–2.0× book. So the stock is at a level that implies extreme pessimism.

What could go wrong on the balance sheet front? Of course input costs could rise or selling prices fall further, and cash flow could be tight for a while. The share price could certainly languish or even drop more (perhaps the market takes it down to 0.3× book in a worst-case scenario). But none of those scenarios threaten the company’s solvency or survival before the cycle has a chance to turn. Clearwater does not need to refinance until 2028; it doesn’t need to issue equity to keep the lights on. The downside risk, in my view, is not permanent capital loss but rather opportunity cost; i.e. the stock could test one’s patience if the recovery takes longer than hoped. However, at 0.4× book and ~3× normalized cash flow, even a couple of years of wait would likely yield very strong returns once value is realized. And I suspect the market will figure out the mispricing much sooner than that.

In summary, the balance sheet gives Clearwater all the necessary time to ride out the downcycle without existential risk. That’s the single most important thing for a cyclical investment. It transforms the proposition into a waiting game rather than a gamble. As an investor, I can handle waiting; I can’t handle permanent loss. Here, the assets and capital structure significantly limit the chance of the latter.

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The Business Today: Cyclical, Not Broken

Let’s talk a bit about Clearwater’s actual business economics and why I’m confident this is not a “melting ice cube.” As mentioned, Clearwater today is a pure-play paperboard producer focused on SBS grade paperboard. It shed the consumer tissue segment (which was lower margin and had different dynamics) to concentrate on what it does best. With the addition of the Augusta mill, Clearwater has roughly 1.3–1.4 million tons of annual capacity, making it one of the largest SBS suppliers in North America.

How the business makes money: It’s straightforward manufacturing. Clearwater produces rolls of SBS paperboard and sells them by the ton. Revenue = volume (tons sold) × price per ton. Its customers (the converters) serve end markets like food packaging, consumer goods packaging, and disposable plates/cups. These end markets tend to be stable, as people don’t suddenly stop buying cereal or frozen dinners in a recession, so underlying demand for paperboard is relatively steady. However, short-term demand can wobble with the economy, and crucially, pricing is highly cyclical because when there’s excess supply in the industry, mills compete on price and margins shrink.

The key driver of margins for a paperboard mill is capacity utilization. These are capital-intensive operations with high fixed costs (labor, maintenance, depreciation, energy to keep the machines running). When a mill is running at 90–95%+ utilization (which is considered “full” in this industry), those fixed costs are spread over many tons of output, so unit costs drop and margins expand. Clearwater’s management has noted that at peak industry conditions (when everyone’s running flat-out and order backlogs are full), they could see >16% EBITDA margins. Conversely, at the current low utilization (~83% industry-wide last quarter), margins compress sharply. Indeed, Clearwater’s adjusted EBITDA margin in Q2 2025 was about 10%, which is roughly breakeven-to-low-profit in terms of net income once you subtract depreciation, interest, etc. In a trough, EBITDA margins can dip into single digits (we’re living it now). Through the cycle, management believes a 13–14% EBITDA margin is a realistic average, which assumes mid-90s% utilization in good times and 80s% in bad times, averaging out.

The income statement mechanics thus go like this: at mid-cycle pricing and volume, Clearwater might do on the order of $1.5–1.6 billion in revenue (that’s their 2025 expected sales, albeit at low utilization). With efficient operations, they aim for ~13–14% EBITDA margins through cycle, so call it ~$200–225 million EBITDA mid-cycle, with upside toward $250M if volumes or prices get a bit better.

Capital intensity: It takes significant capital to keep these mills running well. Clearwater’s annual maintenance capital expenditures normally run about $70–80 million. In downcycles, they sometimes pull back on discretionary capex, but maintenance outages are not optional, as you must periodically shut down to service equipment, replace worn parts, etc. In 2025, as noted, they have two major outages (one already done in Q2 at Cypress Bend for ~$9M, another in Q3 at Lewiston for ~$23–25M). These outages not only incur direct expense but also lost production (which hurts absorption of fixed costs). It’s painful in the short run but essential for the long run. The good news is these big projects (like the new emissions control device they installed at Cypress Bend) often improve efficiency or reliability, paying off down the road. By 2026, maintenance costs should normalize lower (fewer big projects spilling over).

From EBITDA to free cash flow: Clearwater’s target is to convert roughly 40–50% of EBITDA into free cash flow on a normalized basis. This conversion accounts for the maintenance capex and the modest interest on that remaining debt. For example, if they hit $250M EBITDA in a good year, free cash flow could be on the order of $100M+. Even at $200M EBITDA, 45% conversion would give ~$90M FCF. This is important: it tells us that half of incremental EBITDA drops to FCF. So when the cycle improves, the cash flow ramps up fast.

Right now, of course, we are in the opposite situation, as the cycle is at a low point. 2025 is essentially a “reset” year for the new Clearwater Paper. Management’s outlook for full-year 2025 is around $1.5–1.6B in revenue and not a whole lot of EBITDA (since H2 will be very soft). They indicated free cash flow will be close to breakeven for 2025 (after paying for the outages and some one-time project capex). That’s OK; again, the balance sheet can absorb a low cash flow year. The real focus is on what happens after this transition period.

Looking ahead, the industry conditions should gradually improve. New capacity (the cause of oversupply now) gets absorbed as demand grows; for instance, management cited that RISI projects net SBS capacity in the U.S. will decrease by ~350,000 tons in 2026 vs 2025, due to some expected closures or conversions. That alone could push industry utilization back to ~91% (back in the “healthy” zone). Also, if tariffs or trade actions reduce the ~700k+ tons of imports, domestic mills including Clearwater would see volume pick up. And if a few swing mills (integrated companies that can make other grades like liquid packaging or folding boxboard) decide to switch away from SBS because of poor economics, that also tightens supply. We don’t need all of these to happen, as any one or two could start normalizing the market. By 2026 and 2027, it’s reasonable to expect industry operating rates creeping back toward that 90% mark.

When that happens, Clearwater is poised to reap operating leverage. The mills are modernized (one could argue Clearwater has some of the newer SBS capacity after Augusta’s upgrade), costs have been taken out (they cut SG&A by 14% and workforce by 10% already), and the product will still be in demand (packaging isn’t going out of style, and SBS has niche advantages in quality). I firmly believe, and management has reiterated, that once utilization returns to normal, Clearwater can deliver those 13–14% EBITDA margins and $100M+ annual free cash flows it has targeted. Nothing I see contradicts that; in fact, the steps they’ve taken in 2024–25 (cost cuts, focus on core business, maintenance catch-up) all support it.

Clearwater Paper is not a dying business. It’s a cyclical manufacturing business in a temporary slump. The products (paperboard cartons, food boxes, etc.) are very much still needed in the world and largely non-discretionary. The assets (the mills) are well-invested and efficient, certainly not obsolete. The current challenges (low utilization and prices) will self-correct over time as high-cost competitors drop out or demand grows. When you have a solid asset base and a strong balance sheet in a cyclical industry, downturns are when you grit your teeth, perform maintenance, cut costs, and maybe buy back stock…so that when the upturn comes, you emerge leaner and meaner. Clearwater is doing exactly that. This is why I’m confident viewing CLW as an opportunity, not a trap.

Capital Allocation: The Buyback Angle

Another aspect of the Clearwater story that excites me is management’s approach to capital allocation, especially their stance on buybacks at these low prices. The company’s priorities are sensible and shareholder-friendly: first, keep the balance sheet safe (no over-leveraging), second, invest what’s needed to maintain and improve the mills, and then, if there’s excess cash, return it to shareholders in the most effective way. Right now, the most effective way is clearly share repurchases.

As noted, Clearwater has a $100 million share repurchase authorization in place. To put that in perspective, $100M is nearly one-third of the company’s market cap at current prices, which is a very meaningful amount of firepower. In the first half of 2025, they already bought back about $18M worth of stock (roughly 3-4% of shares) before pausing in the second half due to the heavy maintenance spending. The authorization remains active, and management has explicitly said they view buybacks at the right price as a smart use of capital. In the Q2 call, the CFO even called share repurchases “a sound opportunistic investment” by the company.

Buying back stock at 0.4× tangible book is enormously accretive to shareholder value. Every share they retire is like purchasing $1 of assets for $0.40; a bargain for continuing owners. It boosts tangible book value per share and increases future earnings per share, since there are fewer slices of the pie. In Clearwater’s case, if they even used half the authorization ($50M) near current prices, that could reduce the share count by ~15%.

Management’s track record so far gives me confidence. They used the tissue sale proceeds wisely (debt paydown first). They are funding necessary capex, not starving the mills to juice short-term numbers. And when the balance sheet allowed, they started nibbling at the stock buyback already. This pragmatic, opportunistic capital allocation is exactly what I want to see. It means that as shareholders, we’re likely to benefit not just from an eventual cyclical earnings rebound, but also from sound management enhancing shareholder value along the way.

Smart Money Ownership

One strong signal that we deep value investors often look for is “who else is buying?” In the case of CLW, the shareholder list recently got some very interesting new additions. Two respected value-focused investment firms have taken substantial positions, suggesting that seasoned pros see the same mispricing that I do.

First, Towle & Co: a boutique value manager known for hunting in the small-cap bargain bin. Towle initiated a position in CLW in Q1 2025 starting small, but in Q2 2025 they ramped it up aggressively, increasing their holdings by over 500%. As of the Q2 filings, Towle owned about 326,000 shares of Clearwater, which is roughly 2% of the company (and about 2.1% of Towle’s own portfolio, a notable weight for them). Notably, their average cost is around $26 per share, and now the stock is even cheaper. I’ll be very interested to see Towle’s Q3 filing; if they added more in the third quarter dip, that would be a strong vote of confidence from a firm that specializes in deep value.

Second, Southeastern Asset Management (the firm behind the Longleaf Partners funds, run by famed value investor Mason Hawkins) disclosed a brand new stake in CLW as of Q2 2025. Southeastern picked up about 938,000 shares, which is roughly 5.7% of Clearwater’s outstanding shares. For Southeastern, this holding represented around 1.3% of their portfolio. Their initial buys were likely in the ~$26–27 range as well. The fact that two independent value outfits both identified CLW as a mispriced asset around the same time is encouraging.

Valuation: The Asymmetry is the Opportunity

I’ll be the first to say that I’m not a fan of over-precise valuation models for a case like this. What matters more is the big picture skew: is the stock clearly mispriced relative to a reasonable range of outcomes? With Clearwater, I believe the answer is yes, absolutely.

Let’s frame the valuation in a few simple ways:

• Asset valuation: As discussed, the stock is around 0.4× tangible book. That means you’re buying $1 of net assets (mostly mills and working capital) for about 40 cents. Historically, this company and its peers trade much closer to book value or above when things are normal. Unless we believe the assets are worth far less than accounting (which would be odd given the replacement cost argument), there’s a strong case that the stock should at least double just to get to a more typical 1× book in a better environment. And if the business performs well, the stock often trades above book. The key is, at 0.4× book, the margin of safety is considerable: the market is saying either the assets are going to be permanently impaired or idle, or something nearly apocalyptic.

• Earnings/cash flow valuation: If we take management’s “through-cycle” scenario of ~$250M EBITDA and ~$100M FCF, how cheap is the stock? At a ~$350M market cap, $100M FCF is only 3.5× price/FCF; that’s an earnings yield of nearly 30%. Even if you haircutted it to $80M FCF, it’s still under 5×. Those are incredibly low multiples for a business that isn’t actually shrinking, but rather growing. They imply either cash flows won’t materialize or will collapse again. I just don’t see that in a normalized cycle scenario.

• Sales valuation: CLW is around 0.25× sales (enterprise value to sales about 0.5× given some debt). The company’s own presentation shows this is way below industry averages. Again, Clearwater is being treated as if its revenue has no margin or value, like a distressed commodity product. Yet we know that through cycle it has healthy margins. This points to significant multiple expansion potential.

Another way to think about it is to consider a spectrum of outcomes a couple of years out:

• Bear Case: The industry downcycle drags on painfully. Let’s say new capacity keeps the market oversupplied through 2027, utilization never gets out of the 80s%, and Clearwater muddles along with, e.g., $50M EBITDA per year and minimal FCF for several years. In that scenario, the market might continue to value it at 0.3–0.4× book or maybe even drift lower if frustration mounts. The stock could conceivably grind down further, maybe another 20-30% down from here (just to ballpark the “asset floor”, maybe it trades at 0.3× book which would be ~$15/share). That’s unpleasant, but even in this bearish scenario, the company would likely still be solvent and waiting for better days. The downside seems relatively bounded by tangible value and lack of debt pressure.

• Base Case: The cycle gradually normalizes over the next 1-2 years. By 2026, industry capacity rationalizes a bit, demand grows a tad, and Clearwater’s utilization is back into the 90% range. They hit, say, $150-200M EBITDA and $80-100M FCF, and investors start to give credit for that. If the stock even traded at a 10× multiple of $80M FCF, that’s an $800M market cap, or roughly 2× the current price. Or consider EV/EBITDA: at $200M EBITDA and maybe $300M net debt, even a conservative EV/EBITDA of 6× would imply an EV of $1.2B, subtract debt = $900M equity, which is about $55/share. I’m not forecasting those exact numbers, but you get the idea: a return to mid-cycle economics could reasonably double or triple the stock from here.

• Bull Case: We actually swing to a tight market. Perhaps some major competitors exit SBS entirely, or tariffs slam the door on imports, and suddenly domestic mills are running flat-out and have pricing power. Clearwater could find itself selling every ton it can make at higher prices. Volumes + pricing could push EBITDA to $300M+ in a rosy scenario. If that happened, the stock could be a multi-bagger, not just because of earnings, but because the market would likely award a higher multiple when flush times return (as often happens cyclically). Add in the possibility that Clearwater might buy back a ton of stock while it’s cheap, and the per-share earnings in a bull case could really explode. This isn’t a prediction, but it’s a plausible upside scenario to illustrate the asymmetry.

The bottom line is, I don’t need to know exactly what CLW will trade at in 12 or 24 months. What I do know is that at ~$21/share, priced for disaster, the risk/reward is very favorable. The company’s tangible assets and liquidity provide a fairly hard floor, while the “business as usual” outcome offers substantial upside and the “optimistic cycle” outcome offers huge upside. This is the kind of bet where you risk 1 to make 3, 4, or more over a couple of years. I can’t tell you if the stock will be $30 or $40 or $50 a year from now, as it will depend on the pace of cycle recovery, but I’m highly confident it’ll be meaningfully higher than today’s price within a reasonable time frame, because either fundamentals will improve or someone in the market will wake up to how ridiculously cheap this is.

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Risks to the Thesis

No investment is without risks, and I’d be remiss not to discuss what could go wrong. Here are the key risks I see with Clearwater Paper:

• Prolonged Oversupply: The biggest risk is that the SBS industry remains oversupplied longer than expected. If those new capacity additions (from competitors) don’t get offset by closures or higher demand, we could be stuck in the low-utilization environment for years. Utilization in the 80s% for, say, three, four, five years would mean persistently weak margins and meager cash flow for Clearwater. The market’s patience could run out, and the stock might languish or drift lower. Essentially, the “cycle” might test our endurance if it’s unusually long. (That said, even in this scenario, remember Clearwater can survive due to its balance sheet. The concern at that point is more about opportunity cost.)

• Commodity Input Costs: Clearwater’s cost structure includes commodities like wood pulp (fibers), chemicals, and lots of energy (natural gas, electricity) to run the mills. If we hit a bout of high inflation in those inputs, or something like a spike in natural gas prices, it could squeeze margins at a time when they already have little room for compression. They may or may not be able to pass any of that on to customers depending on market conditions. So rising costs (without commensurate price increases for product) is a risk to earnings.

• Low Insider Ownership/Alignment: Insiders own <2%. This risk is more qualitative, as management might not be as incentivized to aggressively maximize the stock price as an owner-operator would be. In worst case, they could pursue growth for growth’s sake or be slow to buy back shares because their personal stake isn’t huge. So far, I don’t see signs of misalignment (they’ve been doing the right things), but it’s something to keep in mind. We rely on the board and large outside shareholders to keep management focused.

• General Macro/Recession: If the economy heads into a recession (beyond what we’ve seen), packaging demand could actually dip a bit more. While consumer staples packaging is resilient, a broad downturn can still cause customers to destock inventory or delay orders. That could make 2025’s slump worse or extend it. Likewise, higher interest rates (though CLW’s debt is fixed-rate) could indirectly hurt by slowing down general business activity or making investors less patient with low-earning companies.

These risks are real, and I take them seriously. The critical point, however, is that I believe the current price already more than discounts these uncertainties. In other words, at $20-something per share, the market is pricing in a whole lot of bad news as if it’s a certainty. Could things get a bit worse? Sure, but a lot of bad-case scenarios are on the table and we’re still looking at a stock trading near multi-decade lows. And importantly, none of the risks above would permanently destroy Clearwater’s value. They might prolong the turnaround or moderate the eventual upside, but as long as the company remains financially sound (which it should), the value will be realized eventually. Part of deep value investing is being willing to live with volatility and uncertainty in the short term, as long as you have a cushion and a favorable long-term payoff structure. I see that here.

Conclusion

The market is currently treating Clearwater Paper as if it’s a broken business in irreversible decline, pricing the stock like the company’s best days are behind it and it will never earn decent profits again. In my analysis, nothing could be further from the truth. What we have here is a classic cyclical downturn, one that was actually exacerbated by Clearwater’s own proactive maintenance actions and an industry capacity surge, not by a collapse in the business model. The important difference is that Clearwater enters this downturn in great shape to survive and thrive on the other side. Thanks to the 2024 restructuring, it has a clean balance sheet with no short-term debt pressures, ample liquidity, and a leaner operation focused purely on the profitable paperboard segment.

This glaring disconnect between perception and reality is where deep value opportunities are born. At today’s stock price, the downside is cushioned by over $47 per share in tangible book value and a debt structure that doesn’t threaten the equity. Meanwhile, the upside - if (when) cash flows normalize and the company smartly uses buybacks – is enormous compared to the current valuation. We don’t need heroic assumptions: even a return to middle-of-the-road industry conditions could make this stock worth multiple times what it trades for now.

That is why I’ve made Clearwater a large position in my portfolio. It’s not because I can predict next quarter’s earnings. It’s because I see a mispricing so extreme that the odds are squarely in my favor. Mr. Market in his panic has thrown out Clearwater’s stock to a level that implies a bleak future that I simply do not think will materialize. By buying at this price, I’m effectively acquiring good assets on the cheap and getting paid to wait for the cycle to turn. Maybe I’ll have to wait six months, maybe two years, but I’m comfortable doing so given the margin of safety. And if I’m right, the returns will be well worth it when sentiment and reality realign.

My bet is that over time, that truth will become apparent, and those who stepped in at these distressed prices will be rewarded for seeing through the gloom.

In my previous articles, I explained why I had allocated 80% of my portfolio to JVA:

• A dirt-cheap valuation on a liquidation basis.

• Fundamentals improving and a reinstated dividend.

• A potential buyback program that could have been massively accretive.

Since then, the stock climbed as much as 40%, and even after the recent pullback it’s still about 15% above where I first mentioned it.

So why did I fully exit? One word: coffee. Between April and August (which corresponds to JVA’s fiscal Q3), coffee prices collapsed nearly 40%. That single move fundamentally changes the short-term outlook for JVA. This article explains why, what I expect next, and where I’m reallocating capital.

Collapsing coffee prices and the income statement

My medium-term outlook on JVA remains positive, as the business fundamentals are still improving. But my decision to exit is purely strategic: I expect Q3 results to trigger a sharp negative market reaction, and I’d rather keep my capital free to deploy elsewhere in the meantime.

JVA will report Q3 around September 11th, and while fundamentals should continue trending upward, I believe the bottom line will come in deep red, and here’s why:

The charts above show Robusta and Arabica prices during JVA’s entire Q3 period. At its lowest point, Robusta fell roughly −39%, Arabica −26%, in just three months. A quarterly move of this magnitude hasn’t occurred in decades. The impact on JVA’s results cannot be overstated.

To understand the effect, let’s break down how JVA converts top line to bottom line, and where this shock hits hardest.

This is Coffee Holding’s income statement from their latest 10-Q filing. Net Sales are straightforward, but notice Cost of Sales: this figure includes derivatives results. If JVA’s hedges lose money, cost of sales goes up; if hedges gain, it goes down. Gross profit, adjusted for derivative swings, serves as a proxy for core profitability.

This margin depends heavily on business mix:

• Green Coffee (~40% of revenue last quarter) behaves like a commodity, thus pricing power is minimal. If JVA buys beans at 100 and prices fall to 70, selling at 100 is nearly impossible.

• Packaged Coffee (~60% of revenue last quarter) has contractual pricing and involves JVA’s roasting facilities, giving more stability and wider margins.

Given JVA’s revenue mix and overall gross margin, it’s reasonable to assume their Green Coffee segment runs at about 5% gross margin, while the Packaged Coffee segment sits closer to 30%.

This is crucial because when coffee prices drop significantly between the time JVA buys and sells its beans, the Green Coffee segment will almost certainly report losses until higher-cost inventory clears.

As for packaged coffee, last quarter’s press release gives insight into how JVA manages pricing and margin stability in this segment, which is key to understanding why packaged coffee will hold up better despite the price crash:

As you can see, margins in the packaged segment tend to be more stable because pricing is set contractually with private-label and supermarket clients. Historically, the risk here shows up when coffee spikes as packaged can run temporarily unprofitable until JVA passes those higher costs through.

The latest press release is dated June 13th, 2025, and coffee prices during Q2 sat around $5.400 for Robusta and $500 for Arabica respectively. That means the company should have consolidated their 30% gross margin for their packaged segment even in an environment where coffee prices sit at those elevated levels.

JVA carries 80–90 days of inventory and uses FIFO, which means what they sell in a quarter is largely what they bought the prior quarter. So with Q3 coffee down at the lows −39% for Robusta and −26% for Arabica, I expect significant losses in green coffee as high-cost inventory meets a much cheaper market, while packaged should print a normal gross margin.

My base case for Q3 is: revenues roughly flat vs. Q2 at ~$23M (packaged up in volume and revenue, green up in volume but down in absolute dollars), ~$2.5M gross loss in Green Coffee, ~$4.5M gross profit in Packaged, for ~$2M total gross profit. With SG&A and officer salaries roughly in line with last quarter, that implies an operating loss of about −$1.5M. And that’s before we even take into account derivatives.

The impact of derivatives

The analysis above only covers the impact on JVA’s core operations from the steep drop in coffee prices. But there’s another critical factor that could drive Q3 deep into the red: derivatives.

Coffee Holding uses derivatives for two main purposes:

• Securing an adequate supply of coffee to meet customer demand

• Partially hedging price risk, aiming to smooth out the impact of volatile green coffee prices and reduce overall cost of sales

Historically, JVA’s hedging strategy has focused on protecting against price spikes, since the real threat is a surge in coffee costs that could wipe out margins on their core business. The flip side, as the company itself warns in its 10-Q, is that sharp price declines can turn those same hedges into substantial losses:

So, I set out to estimate what JVA’s derivatives result might look like after this massive drop in coffee prices. To do this, I pulled data going back to 2012, comparing quarterly movements in Robusta and Arabica prices with the company’s reported derivatives result for those same quarters.

I then ran a multiple linear regression, using:

• Dependent variable: Derivatives result, normalized by revenue (to account for scale)

• Independent variables: Robusta and Arabica price swings during the quarter

The model explains about 48% of the variation, meaning nearly half of the changes in derivatives historically correlate with moves in coffee prices.

Plugging in Q3’s extreme price action (Robusta −39%, Arabica −26%) gives a predicted derivatives loss of about −$1.2 million.

Two Important Caveats

• R² = 0.48, so the model captures only part of the story. Hedge ratios, timing, and strategy choices matter a lot.

• We’ve never seen a quarter with price declines this severe, so this estimate is likely conservative. The actual hit could be significantly worse.

Additional Insights from the Data

• Since 2012, there has never been a quarter where both Robusta and Arabica fell more than 10% and JVA still reported a positive derivatives result.

• The only exception to “down coffee = derivative loss” was Q2 2020: Robusta −11%, Arabica +2%, derivatives + $484K.

• Even in Q2 2025, when Robusta slipped just −4.5% and Arabica rose +6%, the company still booked a derivatives loss of −$280K.

Putting It All Together

• Expected operational loss: −$1.5M

• Expected derivatives loss: ≥−$1M (probably worse)

• Total likely bottom line: −$2.5M or more, which would make this JVA’s second-worst quarter ever (the worst being Q4 2022 at −$4M).

While I’ve tried to keep this as data-driven as possible, my view is that the actual derivatives hit will likely be far worse: potentially −$2 million or more, given how unprecedented these price moves are.

Why I’m Still Bullish for Q4 and Beyond

Again, my decision to sell is purely strategic: I expect the market to overreact to a deeply negative Q3 bottom line, even though the underlying fundamentals remain strong. In fact, I’m still bullish in the medium term, particularly heading into Q4.

The chart above highlights recent financial trends, and the message is clear: revenues are rising, and core gross margins (adjusted for derivatives) are improving. This signals a business with fundamentals moving in the right direction.

Add to that:

• A cleaned up balance sheet,

• A valuation still below tangible equity and not too far from NCAV,

• The successful acquisition and near-turnaround of a competitor,

• And the reinstatement of a dividend,

…and you get a company that looks structurally healthier than it did just a few quarters ago.

Two more points strengthen the bullish case:

1. The Gordon brothers hold a large block of stock options with a $5.40 strike price, giving them a clear incentive to push the stock higher.

2. Q4 should be stellar: inventory purchased at lower Q3 prices will expand packaged margins, while the recent coffee price surge sets up green coffee for better spreads. Combine that with a likely massive derivative gain in Q4 (reversing the Q3 hit), and the company could post one of its strongest quarters ever, more than offsetting the pain in Q3.

A strategic sale

Coffee prices have climbed steadily for nearly five years, and there hasn’t been a single recent correction that lined up so perfectly with JVA’s fiscal quarter start and end as this one.

Given JVA was 80% of my portfolio, I kept analyzing it to see if I had missed something, and looking at the sharp drawdown in coffee prices I started wondering what effects it might have on next quarter. This isn’t the kind of business you hold for a lifetime. History shows that in most of the 15 loss-making quarters over the last 15 years, JVA’s stock fell significantly immediately after the earnings release.

And given how irrational the market is, and how overlooked JVA is, I expect the market to heavily overreact to this quarter’s loss, without considering the longer term implications of its continuous underlying business improvements. Furthermore, I was significantly up on my JVA position, and collecting profits right now and moving on for the time being was a much better prospect than tying up my capital until Q4 gets reported and the stock price reacts accordingly. The price movements of coffee for the quarter have now been public for a month but the market seems not to have done the work on this one. I think that given my research and the above analysis, it’s pretty clear that JVA is going to have a terrible quarter, and I believe that hasn’t been priced in by the market.

What could go wrong

My priority was to lock in profits and remove two risks:

1. A sharp downside move after Q3 results

2. Capital being tied up until JVA’s (I anticipate) stellar Q4

From a loss perspective, there wasn’t much that could hurt me by selling now, but there was the risk of missing out on upside. That upside could come from two possible scenarios:

• Scenario 1: The market has already priced in a bad Q3 and reacts positively, rewarding JVA for ongoing operational improvements and the successful turnaround of its recent acquisition.

• Scenario 2: Management anticipated the price collapse and effectively hedged to the downside, realizing derivative gains large enough to offset operational losses.

I see both as low probability. The first seems unlikely as I don’t subscribe to the efficient market hypothesis, especially for a stock as obscure and under-followed as JVA. The second also seems improbable, because historical filings suggest the company has rarely, if ever, hedged meaningfully to the downside.

Current portfolio and next moves

What have I been doing with my money as of recently? This is my current portfolio:

• 50% cash

• 50% deep ITM and ATM GME leaps with strikes from $15 to $23 expiring on June 18, 2025. I accumulated these calls over the past two months as Gamestop’s implied volatility hit a historical low, with an IV rank of 0% for much of the period. I expect this position to net me 50–80% gains over its lifetime as IV reverts to the mean and the stock price moves higher over the next three to six months.

Gamestop will report earnings in early September, and I’ll be watching closely to see if they issue another convertible at 0% interest. They’ve done this for the past two quarters, and both times it sent the stock down 20–25%; a gift for anyone playing off volatility. This time, however, the stock hasn’t shown any significant upside since the last issuance and seems to be sitting on a local floor. So, either:

• They issue again (stock tanks, giving me an even better entry for more leaps), or

• They hold off at current levels, which are above NAV but still far from historical highs, and the stock is set to go higher on the avoided issuance.

I’ve been trading GameStop and its options for quite some time. It’s a unique situation that, while far removed from traditional value or deep value investing, offers plenty of opportunities to generate significant alpha.

What am I planning to do next?

I am going to allocate 1% of my portfolio to OTC Pink Limited: DSHK. This is an extremely complex situation, hard enough that I can’t assign an exact price target or probability tree. If enough of you are interested, I’ll break down the thesis in a detailed post. For now:

• The stock trades at what could be cents on the dollar, due to perpetual preferred shares eating into any residual value for common holders and some huge liabilities that the company must report on its own balance sheet, but, per prior agreements, may end up being satisfied by a third party.

• The business is cash-flow positive and has a management agreement in place with long-time insiders, where most compensation will go toward buying back both preferred and common shares.

Bottom line: the math is messy, but if this plays out as I expect, this stock could 20x in the next couple of years. A 1% lotto ticket feels right given the upside and complexity.

I’m also considering a significant allocation to HK: 3828 (Ming Fai International). This is a small Hong Kong company making toiletries and single-use items for hotel chains. Key points:

• Solid revenues and earnings

• A 10% dividend yield (with no double taxation as HK doesn’t tax dividends)

• Trades at 0.5x P/B

• Insiders hold a large stake, and activist David Webb owns 15%+

Tomorrow, the board meets to approve interim results for 2025 and, most likely, the size of the next dividend. I’ve owned this stock before and sold to pursue other opportunities, but the valuation remains cheap and operations keep improving, so I’m seriously considering getting back in.

That’s it for now. I’ve been quiet for almost two months, but I’ll be back to posting regular portfolio updates and deep dives into opportunities I find interesting.

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As you might have seen from my Portfolio Updates, I have been holding shares of Theratechnologies for a few months now. I initially bought in April, right after it was announced that Future Pak was (again) interested in acquiring THTX. Fast forward to today, and a press release by the company confirmed that it would be entering a binding arrangement with an affiliate of Future Pak, whereby it would be acquired for $3.01 cash plus one contingent value right (CVR), which could be worth up to an additional $1.19 based on certain gross profit milestones for Thera’s main product.

Personally, considering the opportunity cost of not redeploying this capital until December, and the extremely low but nonzero risk of the transaction falling apart, I sold my position today at $3.15 per share, slightly higher than the cash consideration. In reality, I expect the CVR to provide more than $0.14 during its lifespan; I’d personally settle on around $0.70 of added value. But, considering that my target yearly return is 50-100%, the uncertainty involved in the CVR, and the four months between now and the anticipated closing date of the transaction, I have decided to sell, so that I can quickly redeploy this capital.

The Idea:

Out of all of my investments, about 30% come from novel ideas I developed through in-depth research. The other 70% come from others who have insights or have already done the work. I use several platforms for idea generation, including (in no particular order): Substack, Gödel Terminal, Reddit, Seeking Alpha, and Value Investors Club. The idea for Theratechnologies came from Gödel, a Bloomberg-like terminal developed by Martin Shkreli’s company, which includes a chat feature for investors to share ideas. You can check it out here. For transparency, this is a referral link.

Theratechnologies currently markets two products, one for treatment of visceral fat in HIV patients, and another to treat last-line HIV patients. Future Pak’s first attempt at acquiring Thera was in 2024, for $100 million, a bid which was rejected by the board as “not attractive”. They then submitted a second bid in January 2025, but Thera was already under an exclusivity agreement with another unnamed bidder, so the offer couldn’t be entertained. Lastly, they publicly submitted a bid in April 2025 for $3.51 a share in cash and up to $0.99 a share in CVRs. They did so to force the hand of the company, as they had received minimal engagement from Thera to date. Thera responded with a press release of their own, publicly showcasing Future Pak’s historical attempts at acquiring the company, and stating that they were negotiating a definitive agreement with the unnamed bidder. Just a couple of days later they changed their mind, and moved to further evaluate the potential sale of the Company through an open and non-exclusive process. After that, Thera stated that they didn’t intend to provide further updates or comments other than as required by securities laws.

The Waiting Game:

Future Pak stated in their latest April 2025 bid that they would be able to reach a definitive agreement within four to six weeks, and that financing wouldn’t be an issue as they were backed by their financial partner. The stock price reacted accordingly, reaching a high of $2.97 on May 5th, less than a month after Future Pak’s bid. But, as time went by and no news was released, the price started sliding (albeit on extremely low volume), reaching a low of $2.24 on June 27th. To be fair, management has a history of prioritizing their own interests, which has stressed investors, many of whom, following months of silence, believed the deal could fall apart as management refused to let go of the company. But alas, almost three months later, a definitive agreement was reached, although for a lower cash consideration and overall acquisition price including CVRs. This could have happened for a couple reasons: first, the other bidder might have walked away, thus giving more leverage to Future Pak as Thera was running out of cash. Secondly, Thera’s results for the last quarter, which we’re going to find out about in a couple days, but to which Future Pak would have had access, could have showed worsening results. Either way, a deal was reached, and I realized a 21% gain on my investment, which translated to a portfolio gain of 1.4%, all for a three-month wait.

The Rationale:

This was my second ever risk arbitrage, so I have limited experience.

The reasons I invested were:

1. Future Pak had a history of wanting to acquire Thera, and they submitted three bids in one year, each increasingly favorable than the previous.

2. Thera was in talks with another party interested in acquiring it, thus creating a two bidders situation, which is favorable to shareholders and increases the likelihood of a deal being reached.

3. Thera was running low on cash, increasing pressure on management to close a favorable deal and avoid further dilution.

4. Thera’s biggest institutional investor, Soleus Capital, issued a letter to the BoD urging them to pursue Future Pak’s latest offer.

These were the analytical reasons that made me interested in this acquisition, but there was another one, fundamentally qualitative:

1. Martin Shkreli invested in Thera at $2.75 a share after the company announced a potential sale, and he repeatedly expressed confidence they would reach an agreement.

Aside from the fact that I was able to build my position at a price lower than Shkreli’s, I highly valued his participation. All controversies aside, he is the best source I know when it comes to biopharma investments. I still kept my investment to a small percentage of my portfolio, around 7%, as it was not a high conviction play, and especially not one within my circle of competence. But Martin’s endorsement was the definitive factor in my decision to invest.

Lessons Learned:

The biggest lesson from this story is one that should apply to all of your investments: if the facts don’t change, stick to your thesis, and don’t be fooled by the whims of Mr. Market. Albeit on very low volume, indicating limited significance, Thera’s stock price continued to decline, reaching a low of $2.24 just a couple of days before the definitive agreement was announced. I “only” made a profit of 21% for a holding period of less than three months, but a rational investor could have taken advantage of such a depressed price and realized a 40% gain instead. Individual investors became increasingly stressed as the silence went on (even though the company clearly stated they would release an update just when legally required). It was very unlikely that Future Pak had walked away from the deal, both because of their proven interest in acquiring the company, and the fact that a fall through would have been likelier in the earlier stages of due diligence, rather than three months in. I suggest you visit Stocktwits’ page for THTX, as you will see how irrationally investors behave in times of doubt. The page is now full of positive sentiment, but if you scroll to just a couple of days ago you can clearly see individuals stressing out quite a bit.

In the end, the lesson is that Mr. Market’s whims should be used to our advantage, and should not, in any way, stress us out.

Note: I began writing this article on Thursday, July 3rd. Some references to “today” reflect the timing at which parts were originally written and may not correspond to the current date.

I won’t go in-depth here on why I believe the company is undervalued. Honestly, even a brief glance at their financials and momentum tells the story. And others have already done a great job laying out the case. For a deeper dive, I recommend this piece from Noel Wieder.

Just a few quarters ago, Coffee Holding carried a going concern warning in its 10-K. Today, it's posting double-digit revenue growth, operating profitably, integrating a competitor, and reinstating its dividend.

Despite all this, the market is valuing the company below its book value, essentially assigning zero value to future profits or dividends. I believe one major reason is the $30 million shelf registration filed in March 2025, which looms large over a company with a $24 million market cap.

That filing spooked me too. The company has minimal interaction with shareholders and no investor relations email address. A few weeks ago, I even called to ask when earnings would be released, since an announcement hadn’t even been made public. That lack of communication may be why JVA is so under the radar.

Through trial and error, I was able to piece together Mr. Gordon’s likely email address and wrote to share my concerns. Here’s what I said:

1. The Shelf Offering: While I understand having a shelf available as a precaution, a $30 million authorization for a $24 million company is massive. If ever executed at current prices, it would be value-destructive, issuing shares below book value, and that’s before considering the company’s growth prospects. I asked whether he would consider withdrawing the shelf or at least making a clear public statement that it won’t be used under current conditions.

2. Capital Allocation: I also questioned the return of the dividend. While dividends are nice in theory, they are less tax efficient than buybacks, especially when the company is trading at a discount to its equity. JVA recently acquired Empire Coffee Co. at what Mr. Gordon described as 60 cents on the dollar. Why not repurchase our own stock at the same kind of discount?

To the first concern, Mr. Gordon replied that while he understands my position, “almost all companies have a shelf out there just in case they do need to raise capital.” More importantly, he added:

“That is the only reason we have one in place, and we have no intention of utilizing the shelf at this time or in the immediate future.”

Would I rather see the shelf withdrawn? Yes. But this answer helped clarify that management sees it as a contingency tool, not, as suggested in the March 21st press release, a strategic lever to fund acquisitions using undervalued equity. That release described the shelf as a way to “use our stock as currency rather than take on bank debt,” which understandably spooked the market. Mr. Gordon’s direct reply strikes a much more reassuring tone. The commitment not to use the shelf in the immediate future is, in my view, meaningful.

As for my follow-up email on capital allocation:

Mr. Gordon gave a brief but noteworthy reply:

“All I will say is that I agree with your analysis.”

Now, I want to be crystal clear: this is not a commitment. It doesn’t signal that a buyback is coming. But it shows that the CEO hears shareholders, and he sees the logic. That, to me, matters.

Warren Buffett has often said that sound management is key to any investment. My experience with Mr. Gordon, despite JVA’s limited public engagement, left me with the impression of a level-headed, rational CEO.

JVA’s stock has been volatile post-earnings, but I believe the fundamental disconnect remains: the business has changed, but the market hasn’t. The fear of dilution still hangs in the air. But for those of us willing to dig deeper, talk to management, and look at the numbers, this could be an opportunity hiding in plain sight.

Footnote

To anyone questioning the authenticity of this interaction, I’ve included a redacted screenshot confirming the email domain (coffeeholding.com), while omitting Mr. Gordon’s direct address, as it’s not public.

Cash - 6%

- 66%

- 10%

JUN 18 ‘26 15 Call - 10%

- 6%

JUN 20 ‘25 1 Put - CSPs representing 49% of cash

Portfolio Update:

Cash - 14.3%

- 51%

JUN 18 ‘26 15 Call - 10.7%

- 10.6%

- 6.3%

- 5.9%

- 1.2%

JUN 20 ‘25 6 Put - CSPs worth 42% of cash

JUN 20 ‘25 1 Put - CSPs worth 21% of cash

Although I initially planned to average up to 40%, the opportunity to average down at such a discounted price has changed my approach. I now have additional buy orders in place in case the price drops further, something I hadn’t originally anticipated. My cost basis has come to $3.65, and I'm glad to be averaging down under these circumstances.

Cash - 33.7%

JVA -1.59%↓ - 42.2%

HLX 2.25%↑ - 10.1%

THTX 0.78%↑ - 6.4%

CHGG 4.79%↑ - 6.1%

DSWL 0.00%↑ - 0.5%

18% of cash is allocated to CSPs on HLX 2.25%↑

9% of cash is allocated to CSPs on CHGG 4.79%↑

- 36.5%

- 9.5%

- 6.5%

- 5.5%

- 1%

14% of cash is allocated to CSPs on

7% of cash is allocated to CSPs on

Cash - 49%

JVA -1.60%↓ - 30.5%

HLX 7.02%↑ - 9.5%

THTX 1.90%↑ - 6.3%

CHGG 0.42%↑ - 3.6%

DSWL -0.44%↓ - 1.1%

12% of cash is allocated to CSPs on HLX 0.96%↑

6% of cash is allocated to CSPs on CHGG 0.00%↑

In the future I will be posting my investment theses and research. For now, I’m just updating my portfolio given the limited amount of time I have.

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JVA -1.60%↓ - 24%

HLX 7.02%↑ - 10%

THTX 1.90%↑ - 6.5%

CHGG 0.42%↑ - 3.5%

DSWL -0.44%↓ - 1%

10.5% of cash is allocated to CSPs on HLX 0.96%↑

2.5% of cash is allocated to CSPs on

In the future I will be posting my investment theses and research. For now, I’m just updating my portfolio given the limited amount of time I have.

- 21%

- 9.2%

- 6.3%

- 2.5%

- 1%

9.5% of cash is allocated to CSPs on HLX 0.96%↑

- 17.8%

- 9.4%

- 6.4%

- 1.4%

6% of cash is allocated to CSPs on .

Today I closed my position, added to my position, and opened the CSPs.

Will be posting updates when significant changes to my portfolio occur.

- 29%

- 18%

- 6.5%

- 6.5%

- 1%